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Abstract. This article presents the debt crisis in eurozone, which is the result of a 
concept error of the Economic and Monetary Union. The situation has become critical for 
countries such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain. The duality that characterizes nowadays 
the financial aspect of the European integration can be barely maintained on long term, 
because the Monetary and Economic Union operates with the participation of 16 member 
states, while the members of the eurozone remain sovereigns on their budgetary policies. 
Without broad structural reforms, the sustainability of the Economic and Monetary Union is 
questioned. 
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1. General considerations regarding the coordination between the budgetary  
policies and the monetary policy in Eurozone 
 
The regulations for the eurozone have been established by the status of the European 
Central Bank and the conditions of adherence to the eurozone  have been imposed by the 
Treaty of Maastricht and through the Stability and Growth Pact. Afterwards, these conditions 
have become less strict, in order to accept the adherence of Italy, who had a great budgetary 
deficit. This has been a political decision by means of which smaller and more different 
economies in comparison with Germany and France were allowed to enter the eurozone. But 
the smaller states were more susceptible to divergencies, yet this didn´t represent a problem as 
the Monetary Union´s purpose is precisely to achieve the convergence of the member states´ 
economy. 
The development of the national economies has an impact on the inflation perspectives 
within the eurozone, they influence the monetary conditions of the area and as a consequence 
the economic policies, especially the budgetary ones, of the states participating to the 
eurozone has to be rigurously monitored imposing their close coordination. 
The budgetary policies within the Eurozone are elaborated by the national governments 
of the member states, but they have to respect the regulations of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
which represent an instrument of budgetary coordination. The budgetary policy is maybe the 
one registering the greatest differences between member states, due to the fact that the public 
budget represents the most representative form of expression of the national sovereignty from 
economic point of view. Important instrument of economic orientation, the public budget, by 
means of the expenses and public incomes, influence both public and private investments and 
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the savings and monetary circulation. For these reasons, the coordination of the budgetary 
policies of the eurozone states is particularly difficult to be realized (Seria Micromongrafii. 
Politici europene, 2005, Uniunea_Economică_şi_monetară.pdf, pp.10). 
The arrangements regarding the coordination between budgetary policies and 
monetary policy within the eurozone are quite complex. Among the institutions participating 
to the coordination process, the European Commission occupies a central position, taking part 
to the meetings of all the other bodies, establishing the agenda for the European Council and 
proposing the procedures concerning the financial sustainability of the member states. 
However, in the eurozone there hasn´t been yet developed a framework for political 
cooperation between the European Central Bank and the national governments, even if the 
single currency creates the necessity of a close collaboration. The absence of a place where 
there can be defined a common position for monetary and budgetary policies makes the 
institutional organization of the eurozone more oriented towards the information exchange, 
than towards the identification of action lines for the coordination of activities. The European 
Central Bank, doubtful concerning the budgetary decisions of national governments, tend to 
defend the freedom of action in order it might, if necessary, counterattack the tendencies 
towards budgetary deficits. The national governments, unable to convince the European 
Central Bank to pay more attention to the specific conditions of their economies,  being 
unfamiliar with the budgetary behavior of the other governments, are skeptical regarding the 
cooperation and prepared to counterattack any position of restrictive character of the monetary 
policy and they are obstinate concerning the acceptance of the supplementary reduction of 
their fiscal sovereignty (Panico, Vazquez Suarez, 2008, p. 16). 
The method used for the coordination of economic policies is used especially on a 
“slight consolidation”, that is on the ability to convince the national governments to follow an 
appropriate behavior by means of monitored dialogue, information exchange, warnings and 
pressures. 
The procedures regarding the intensification of the coordination of monetary and 
budgetary policies try to establish ˝common behavior regulations˝, mentioning the Procedure 
of excessive deficit and the Stability and Growth Pact. The procedures are implemented by 
means of a report made by the European Commission on the base of the results of multilateral 
surveillance. The Financial and Economic Committee examines the report and expresses its 
opinion about it. Economy and Finance Ministers Council of the European Union (ECOFIN) 
takes a formal decision regarding the existence of a violation and recommend to the concerned 
state correction measures, imposing two limit terms concerning the adoption of measures and 
the rectification of violation. In case the member state forgets about the limit terms, ECOFIN 
can notify this issue and may demand to the state to make a deposit to the Commission, the 
amount of which depends on the level of violation. If ECOFIN decides that during a period of 
two years the violations haven´t been rectified, it may demand the change of the deposit in 
penalty. 
 
2. Debt crisis triggers in the eurozone 
 
With a certain delay, the Eurozone has been affected by an international financial crisis 
having been unleashed in the USA in August 2007. Since the beginning of the second 
semester of 2008, eurozone GDP registered a dramatic decrease, counting at the end of the 
year a real increase rate of only 0.5%, in comparison with the former year, when this rate was 
2.8%. 2008 represented a year of profound recession, with a GDP decrease of 4.1% in the 
eurozone, followed by a slight revival in 2010. 
The global effect of these economic conditions was the drastic deterioration of the 
general budget balances of the governments of the eurozone member states, reaching a 
budgetary deficit of 6.3% of GDP in 2009, in comparison with 0.6% of GDP in 2007 and 2% 
of GDP in 2008. The public debt registered a continuous increase from 66% of GDP in 2007 
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to 78.7% of GDP in 2009. The budgetary deficit was considerable in Spain, where it increased 
from 4.1% in 2008 to 11.2% in 2009, while during the years preceding the crisis it has 
registered excess. Greece represents a particular case, the past budgetary deficits increasing 
continually, reaching 13.6% of GDP in 2009. As a consequence, in 2009, Greece, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Ireland, Holland, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia 
entered the procedure of excessive deficit. The member states having the best position 
concerning budgetary balance and public debt are Denmark, Sweden and Finland, and it is due 
to the high budgetary excesses registered before the beginning of the crisis. 
 
Table 1 
The evolution of budget balances during the period 2006-2011 within the eurozone  
(% of GDP) 
 
Member state within the 
eurozone 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Belgium 0.3 -0.2 -1.2 -6 -5 -5 
Germany  -1.5 0.2 0 -3.3 -5 -4.7 
Ireland 3 0.1 -7.3 -14.3 -11.7 -12.1 
Greece -2.8 -5.1 -7.7 -13.6 -9.3 -9.9 
Spain 1 1.9 -4.1 -11.2 -9.8 -8.8 
France -2.3 -2.7 -3.3 -7.5 -8 -7.4 
Italy -3.3 -1.5 -2.7 -5.3 -5.3 -5 
Luxemburg 1.4 3.6 2.9 -0.7 -3.5 -3.9 
Holland 0.6 0.2 0.7 -5.3 -6.3 -5.1 
Austria  -1.6 -0.4 -0.4 -3.4 -4.7 -4.6 
Portugal  -3.9 -2.6 -2.8 -9.4 -8.5 -7.9 
Slovenia -1.3 0 -1.7 -5.5 -6.1 -5.2 
Finland 4 5.2 4.2 -3.8 -4.3 -2.9 
Malta -2.6 -2.2 -4.5 -3.8 -4.3 -3.6 
Cyprus -1.2 3.4 0.9 -6.1 -7.1 -7.7 
Slovakia  -3.5 -1.9 -2.3 -6.8 -6 -5.4 
UE-16 -1.3 -0.6 -2 -6.3 -6.6 -6.1 
Source:http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2010/pdf/ee-2010-4_en.pdf 
 
In the case of three eurozone countries: Italy, Belgium and Greece it is foreseen a 
public debt of over 100% in 2010 and 2011: 
 
Table 2 
The evolution of public debt within eurozone during the period 2006-2011 (% of GDP) 
 
Member state within 
the eurozone 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
2011-
forecasts 
Belgium 87.9 84.2 89.8 96.7 99 100.9 
Germany 67.6 65 66 73.2 78.8 81.6 
Ireland 24.9 25 43.9 64 77.3 87.3 
Greece 95.9 95.7 99.2 115.1 124.9 133.9 
Spain 39.6 36.2 39.7 53.2 64.9 72.5 
France 63.7 63.8 67.5 77.6 83.6 88.6 
Italy 106.5 103.5 106.1 115.8 118.2 118.9 
Luxemburg 6.7 6.7 13.7 14.5 19 23.6 
Holland 47.4 45.5 58.2 60.9 66.3 69.6 
Austria  62 59.5 62.6 66.5 70.2 72.9 
Portugal  64.7 63.6 66.3 76.8 85.8 91.1 
Slovenia 26.7 23.4 22.6 35.9 41.6 45.4 
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Member state within 
the eurozone 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
2011-
forecasts 
Finland 39.2 35.2 34.2 44 50.5 54.9 
Malta 63.7 61.9 63.7 69.1 71.5 72.5 
Cyprus 64.6 58.3 48.4 56.2 62.3 67.6 
Slovakia  30.4 29.3 27.7 35.7 40.8 44 
UE-16 68.3 66 69.4 78.7 84.7 88.5 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2010/pdf/ee-2010-4_en.pdf 
 
In economic literature there´s appeared two hypotheses regarding the triggers of debt 
crisis within the eurozone: 
• The unhealthy combination of fiscal indiscipline of the member states and the 
speculative out of control attacks on the financial markets 
• The existent imbalance between the eurozone member states, due to the conception 
defect of the Economic and Monetary Union 
In fact, the main cause of the internal structural imbalances in Economic and Monetary 
Union is the great current account imbalances within the Economic and Monetary Union. 
Though the current account imbalances have internal roots, the associated problems do not 
limit only to national level. Taking into account the collateral effects on the financial markets 
integrated in the eurozone, they represent a problem also for other member states and for the 
Economic and Monetary Union itself. The main problem for the eurozone member states with 
current account deficits was the fact that the capital inflow hasn´t always been efficiently 
allocated. In Spain and Ireland there´s been registered an enlargement of the real estate 
markets, in Greece the great government deficits have been financed and in Portugal the 
private consumption has been supported. This allocation stimulated the domestic demand and 
as a result of the inflexibility of the employment market, the level of wages increased more 
than the level of work productivity. This lead to the reduction of the competitiveness for the 
concerned countries and as a consequence the imports have increased, the exports have 
decreased and the current account deficit has accentuated. 
The debt crisis within the eurozone affected profoundly especially three states: Greece, 
Spain and Portugal, leading to a lack of trust between these countries and the other member 
states. The possible default of the Greek public debt would have a quite reduced global effect 
on the other member states, taking into account the fact that the Greek GDP represents only 
2.5% of the eurozone GDP. A greatest danger caused by the default of the Greek public debt 
would be the loss of confidence of foreign investors in the other eurozone countries, 
especially in Portugal and Ireland, which are also confronting budgetary deficit issues and 
considerable public debts. Italy has also a great public debt, exceeding 100% of GDP, but its 
deficit is though under the eurozone average deficit and as a result, it doesn´t make part of the 
category of countries being the most exposed to risk. Spain has a relatively decreased debt, of 
only 53.2% of GDP in 2009, being under the Eurozone average with about 25%. 
 
3. The impact of eurozone debt crisis on Greece 
 
The economy of Greece registered the fastest increase within the eurozone during the 
period 2000-2007, with average annual increases of GDP of 4.2%. However, the GDP per 
individual remained under the Community average, being in 2009 at 93% of the Community 
average. The economy of Greece confronts significant problems, including the increase of 
unemployment, an inefficient bureaucracy, fiscal evasion and corruption.  
The international financial crisis had a profoundly negative effect on Greece, 
especially on the industries – tourism and maritime transport, having been affected by the 
economic decline, registering in 2009 a decrease of income of 15%. 
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How can be explained this debt crisis present in Greece? Greece have clearly a 
unsustainable budgetary policy. At the same time, since the adherence to the Economic and 
Monetary Union in 2001, this country had an inflation rate permanently higher than the 
eurozone average, generating a significant deviation from the purchasing power parity and 
determining important losses of the competitiveness and high current account deficits 
(Arghyrou, Tsoukalas, 2010, p.6). In order to maintain the orientations of the Economic and 
Monetary Union, the Greek government declared permanently and deliberately before and 
after the adherence to the eurozone false official economic statistics. The international 
financial crisis evidenced the deteriorated budgetary position of Greece, generating among 
others the increase of the unemployment rate, a huge public debt of 115.1% of GDP in 2009, 
the massive increase of the budgetary deficit from 5.1% in 2007 to 13.6% in 2009. 
In order to overcome the debt crisis in Greece, there have been taken into account 
several solutions, such as the withdrawal of Greece from the eurozone, accompanied by the 
restructuration of its public debt and the financial support from the part of the other 
eurozone member states. Some specialists consider that the retreat of Greece from the 
eurozone wouldn´t have been a feasible solution, because the expenses would have exceed 
with a high rate the benefits. Any sign of retreat from the eurozone would have result a 
massive retreat of capital affecting seriously the bank system. Finally, there has been chosen 
the financial support. 
The ministers of Finance of the eurozone and the International Monetary Fund 
approved at the beginning of May 2010, an emergency package of financial loan for Greece of 
110 billion Euro for the following 3 years, that is to be covered by the loans of the eurozone 
member states (80 billion Euro), and by the loan accorded by the International Monetary Fund 
(30 billion Euro). In exchange, in order to obtain financial support and to avoid bankruptcy, 
the Greek government assumed austerity measures in amount of 30 billion Euros. As 
measures we can mention: the 13th and the 14th salaries won´t be accorded any longer, the 
minimum retiring age will be 60 years, the VAT will increase from 21% to 23%, the 
budgetary expenses will be reduced to 10% of GDP, the public investments will be reduced, a 
new tax will be introduced to illegal constructions, new taxes will be imposed on pollution, 
gambles and profits of companies. It is estimated a reduction of public expenses with about 
7% of GDP and an increase of incomes of about 4% of GDP until 2013. 
 Beside these direct fiscal measures, there have been initiated a series of structural 
fiscal reforms such as: the reform of pensions, of healthcare and fiscal system. Some of these 
concrete measures are:  
- The increase of standard retiring age to 65 years, without the possibility of 
anticipated retirement; 
- The implement of the accrual accounting within the hospitals; 
- The limitation of exemptions and deductions from the income tax; 
- The fierce fight against fiscal evasion; 
- Auditing individuals owning wealth and carrying out independent activities. 
The progress registered after the implement of this program is monitored each 
semester on the base of some quantitative performance criteria. 
 
4. Possible measures for the exit of eurozone from debt crisis 
 
The Eurozone is extremely prudent in its economic policy actions. While the European 
Central Bank was forced to deal with turbulences on the market, its actions were tied to those 
of the EDF and of other important central banks. Beside the advantages of a common 
currency, the governments of the European Union´s member states showed a strong solidarity. 
Some of them lead directly to a significant financial support for the countries not having 
adhered to the Euro currency. A monetary union with inflation differences within member 
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states supports the risk of the appearance of a debt spiral leading to the increase of debts 
according to the inflation level.  
As the profound causes of the current account imbalances have an internal character, it 
is very important to act in order to correct them, an issue being in the charge of the member 
states. Thus, it is needed a series of structural reforms necessary to increase the 
competitiveness of commercial societies on the internal market by means of the increase of 
productivity and costs control. The countries having current account deficits must improve the 
flexibility of employment markets and to consolidate the national budgets. The countries 
having current account surplus must act by stimulating the internal demands and the imports 
utilizing incentive fiscal policies. 
The ministers of Finance of the 16 eurozone member states signed on the 7th of June 
2010 an agreement allowing the introduction of a European Financial Stability Facility 
counting an amount of 440 billion Euros, as guarantees of the European Union´s member 
states. This ˝vehicle with special purpose˝ will help the eurozone member states in case they 
won´t be able to solve the economic problems, each country being allowed to loan 440 billion 
Euros. A second proposal for the assurance of financial stability on long term having been 
made by the European Union leaders refers to the creation of a single authority in charge with 
the surveillance and the coordination of budgetary policies. But this proposal has no chance to 
be materialized because of the opposition of France and Italy. 
In our opinion, the optimal solutions could be the fundamental changes regarding the 
restructuration of the Economic and Monetary Union and the solution of the contradictions 
referring to imposing a single currency and a common monetary policy in countries having 
different budgetary policies. Beside the solution of serious budgetary issues within the 
eurozone, it is considered beneficial the creation of a surveillance mechanism and assistance 
within it, which might react faster to crises situations. The new system should also define 
clearly the assistance costs, both in monetary terms and loss of fiscal sovereignty terms. 
 
Conclusions  
 
Several specialists and we consider that the eurozone is not an optimal area for a single 
currency, as the member states gave asymmetric feedbacks regarding different types of 
markets and economic shocks. It is considered that the healthy fiscal nucleus of the eurozone 
is composed of three states: Germany, Finland and Holland. As a result, the eurozone would 
form a closer and stronger union if it enlarged on a more limited geographical area. 
The duality that characterizes nowadays the financial aspect of the European 
integration can be barely maintained on long term, because the Monetary and Economic 
Union operates with the participation of 16 member states, while the members of the eurozone 
remain sovereigns on their budgetary policies. Without broad structural reforms, the 
sustainability of the Economic and Monetary Union is questioned. 
In conclusion, the adherence to the eurozone having a weak structured economy 
generates net expenses and in case it is not accompanied by adequate national policies it 
doesn´t guarantee the economic catch up. At the same time, the member states have to be 
competitive, needing for this purpose a structural adaptation of the economy before the 
adherence in order to reduce the impact of the competitiveness as a result of the participation 
to an economic and monetary union. As a result, we consider that Romania should wait until it 
becomes competitive and prepared to enter the eurozone, because it hasn’t the degree of 
optimality desired by the institutors, the case of Greece being a relevant example. 
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